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Article 4

EXPLAINING AND CURBING CAPTURE
BY RACHEL E. BARKOW*
Rachel E. Barkow discusses the problem of agency capture, the
undue influence of regulatory agencies by members of the industries
they regulate. She explains how agency capture arises and how it
manifests itself in the financial industry, a well-funded and wellorganizedsector. Finally, Barkow proposes ways to design agencies to
greaterinsulate them from capture.
I want to discuss the dynamics of capture, what we might mean
by it, and why it might occur. I want to try to figure out why it might be
the case that an agency would not listen to competing evidence or
would seem to be prone to a particular view.I
Usually when we talk about capture what we mean is an agency
that is more responsive to the desires of the entities it is supposed to be
regulating than it is to the general public. So it is the idea of undue
industry influence. The term "capture" sounds more robust than just
undue influence. If an agency is captured, it sounds like it is completely
overtaken; it is just a puppet with someone else controlling the strings.
But I think it is more accurate to think about disproportionate influence
in the context of agency capture. It is a question of degree.
Now there is a difficult empirical question about how you
measure capture. How do you figure out that an agency is captured as
opposed to a situation where the agency simply reached a result that you
did not like, and you are tempted to say they must be captured by the
other side because the agency ruled for them instead of for you. I am
going to leave it to the political scientists to talk about how you measure
capture and how prevalent it is. I am going to proceed on the
assumption that capture does happen. I'll explain why I have that
working assumption even though I cannot tell you the degree of capture
* Segal Family Professor of Regulatory Law and Policy and Faculty Director, Center on the
Administration of Criminal Law, New York University School of Law. Prof. Barkow
delivered these remarks during The Political Economy of Financial Regulation Conference,
which was held at George Washington University on February 7 & 8, 2013.
1. See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through
Institutional Design, 89 TEx. L. REV. 15 (2010).
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in any particular case.
I want to discuss why it is that this idea of disproportionate
influence can develop at an agency. The first thing is that the entities
that agencies regulate-and certainly this is true when we are talking
about the financial sector and financial institutions-are well financed
and they are well organized. What that means is that financial
institutions are well placed (particularly as compared to the general
consumer population) to monitor what it is that agencies are doing.
Financial institutions can keep tabs on everything that might be
happening and challenge anything that they do not like because they
have the organization and the financial resources to do it. If consumer
groups on the other side of an issue do not have sufficient resources to
monitor and do not have the resources to challenge, they are going to be
outmatched. A rational agency, all else being equal, will want to avoid
being tied up with legal challenges and oversight, and somebody
constantly coming down on them to say that they are doing something
wrong. So an agency has an incentive to work with organized interests
instead of antagonizing them. An agency could have that incentive in
good faith to achieve its mission; because if an agency gets tied up
constantly litigating with one organized interest, it really cannot do
anything else. So taking the perspective of a rational, well-meaning
agency, one can see why it still might be prone to listen to those wellfinanced, well-organized interests.
In addition, because the banking industry is so well-organized
and financed, it is in a position not just to be at the heels of the agency,
but to go to congressional overseers. The industry has the ability to
make political contributions and to lobby Congress when it sees
something it does not like. The agency has to be aware of this if it
wants to get anything done. An agency will be constantly getting called
into Congress if congressional overseers are angry with it because big
contributors are telling them this agency has gone insane. Even agency
heads acting in good faith will say to themselves, "We can't get tied up
that way. We have to figure out how we can appease these interests
enough so that we are not constantly getting called in before
congressional overseers."
The other reason that you might see undue industry influence
has to do with what is often referred to as the revolving door. People
pursue careers in an area because they are interested in the subject.
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They could go work either at a government agency or in the private
sector. So a revolving door can develop where you have people who
work at agencies who might, when they leave, go work for the
industries they regulated because that is their area of substantive
expertise. They are thinking about where they are going to go next.
They are probably not going to say, "I really enjoy banking, but it's
time to try telecommunications." They are probably going to go right
into the banking industry. The effect and scope of the revolving door is
a measurement question for the political scientists. But if you think
about the incentive structures, agency employees might be thinking
about how they are perceived by the very industry that they might
ultimately join later.
Even if it is not a question about thinking where the next
employment move is, there is a question of who goes to work at an
agency in the first place. What kind of people? What kind of
perspective do they have when they go there? I think you might see
cognitive biases that people are not even aware that they have. If they
came from a particular industry and then they go to work for an agency,
they bring the perspective of where they used to be. If they were
working in a banking context, then they understand and relate to
bankers. When they go to the agency they can see things from the
perspective of bankers. What you might end up with at the agency is a
particular culture that is attuned and sensitive to an interest that
employees know the best because that is precisely where they came
from.
The other reason that you might see undue influence develop is
information. The financial regulatory agencies have to think about the
ramifications on the financial industry before they do something. Put
another way, to regulate effectively, an agency needs information on
how rules are going to affect the entities they regulate. Where does the
agency get that information? What agencies usually do is listen to who
is in front of them: the well-financed, organized entity that is so happy
to help and explain the consequences of what the agency is going to do.
The entity explains how the proposed action is going to affect it, and the
question is does the agency have the requisite intelligence and data to
second guess that? Are they in a position to say, "Will you really
collapse and therefore send ripples throughout the economy and destroy
the free world as we know it?" Or will they have the necessary
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confidence to say, "I disagree with what you are predicting. I took a
couple of classes on this in school and I think I'm going to give my own
judgment a whirl and see how it goes?" It is a question of whether
agency officials are confident enough to dispute what they are hearing.
I am not taking a position on the normative worth of any of this.
I am just trying to explain to you where this capture dynamic might
develop to address the puzzle of why agencies do not do more. In the
case of financial services, the "too big to fail" problem is enormous. If
the agencies guess wrong, they are being told that it is going to impact
the entire economy. The agencies need to be right about their
information if they are going to second guess what the institutions are
telling them. The dynamics I have discussed develop together and
coalesce and create cultures at agencies.
There have been case studies about how cultures develop within
agencies. It gets really hard to change those cultures once they have
been established. They are historically based. You may have to go
back to the turn of the century to find out how things got off the ground
at a particular agency, to understand how an agency might have become
the way it is. If you read Bailout by Neil Barofsky, 2 he describes what
it was like to deal with the banking regulators. He writes a lot about
how the regulators he worked with talked about how the bankers have
reputational risk to think about. 3 Barofsky says in the book that he did
not want to hear that anymore because bankers' concern for their
reputations did not stem the tide of what was happening. What is most
interesting for the capture discussion is the description in the book of
regulators believing in a sense of reputation. That reflects the culture
that develops over time.
So, however we measure it, undue influence is going to exist.
There is going to be this pressure for an agency to take a regulated
entity's interest into account in a disproportionate way as compared to
the way the agency considers the interest of the public.
I could put any agency into that model, but I want to give you a
couple of specific capture dynamics that are in play in some of the
financial services sectors. This is not my area of expertise; I'm a
generalist administrative law person. But I do think there are some
2. See NEIL BAROFSKY, BAILOUT: AN INSIDE ACCOUNT OF How
ABANDONED MAIN STREET WHILE RESCUING WALL STREET (2012).

3. Id. at 131.

WASHINGTON
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interesting dynamics in this context that are important to note. First, if
you set up an agency and you give it more than one mission, it is going
to play favorites. And the agency is going to favor the mission that is
the dominant mission, the one that Congress cares about. The agency is
not like a parent who wants to love all its children equally. Let's say
you set up financial regulators and you tell them that they are charged
with paying attention to monetary policy, bank supervision, and safety
and soundness. And you say, we would also like you to do consumer
protection. The dynamic you have just created is an agency that is
going to have multiple missions. At least one of these missions is going
to fall by the wayside, and what we have seen historically is that one is
consumer protection.4 Consumer protection is not the favored child, to
carry the analogy further. So when you create these multiple mission
agencies, you really have to think about which mission is going to
dominate.
The other thing that really surprised me in looking at financial
regulatory agencies - that they were ever set up this way - is that an
entity could decide how it wanted to charter itself It could move
around within either the state or federal system, from bank to thrift or
vice versa. 5 A deposit-taking entity could thus pick its regulator.
Furthermore, those agencies were funded by fees from the entities they
regulated. So the agencies were in a competition with each other to have
the financial institutions charter with them. I could not have devised a
more ill-considered scheme if you had asked me to think about it and
try. This system creates a race to the bottom. The agency wants to
appease the entity to charter with it. What is the best sales pitch an
agency has to get somebody to charter with it? "I am not going to
regulate you at all. I am going to do whatever you want. I am going to
preempt state regulations that you do not like. I would like you to come
on over." If it is not said explicitly, the incentives are all there to do
that. So that is something that is specific to this context. This system

4. See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1,
90 (2008) ("These agencies are designed with a primary mission to protect the safety and

soundness of the banking system. This means protecting banks' profitability. Consumer
protection is, at best, a lesser priority. . . .").
5. In the United States, banks may operate under state or federal charters as part of the
"dual banking system." For further information on state versus federal bank charters, see
LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK FINANCIAL SERVICE

ACTIVITIES: CASES & MATERIALS 184-88 (4th ed. 2011).
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gives additional reasons why you might see capture in this particular
context.
I want to use my remaining time to highlight what you could do
if you wanted to guard against capture from developing, assuming you
had the political will and the incentive to do it.
First, if you had something like the OTS-OCC dynamic I
described above, where banks could pick their regulator, you would
either have to make it so that the organizations could not pick their own
charter and regulator; or you would need to give the agencies a funding
source that did not depend on the entities themselves; or you would
merge the agencies into one entity which obviously was done in DoddFrank.6
For other agencies and other dynamics, what else can you do to
minimize capture? In the law school world, law students are typically
told when they are talking about setting up independent agencies that
the key thing to consider is whether the head of the agency can be
removed by the President for cause or not. Although that is the big
issue in law schools, I think that one actually does not matter very much
because it is hard to remove an agency head even if the President has
the ability to do it at will. That does not seem to be the linchpin.
What I want to do is highlight for you some of the key
mechanisms that do not get a lot of attention, or at least have not so far
in law school settings. But I think policymakers are starting to pay
attention to them. The first one is how the agency is funded. Where
does the agency get its money?7 If the agency gets its money from
Congress, then that link is right there. Every time the agency wants to
do something, it knows it is going to be risking its funding source if it
6. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank
Act), Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 312, 124 Stat. 1376, 1521 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §
5412) (Dodd-Frank merged the OTS functions into the OCC and the FDIC. The OTS's
authority over state savings associations was given to the FDIC. The OCC received
authority over federal savings associations.)
7. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve is funded by assessments received
from Federal Reserve Banks in accordance with the Federal Reserve Act of 1913. The
Board of Governors is self-sufficient, receiving no government appropriations. See OFFICE
OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, APPENDIX: BUDGET OF THE U.S.

GOVERNMENT

1336

(2014),

available

at

http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2014/assets/appendix.pdf. The
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) is funded by appropriations from the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve, capped and adjusted for inflation. If this allocation is
inadequate, the CFPB may also request funds through the congressional appropriations
process. Id. at 1206.
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makes Congress mad. If what makes Congress mad is the agency
appearing hostile to well-financed and well-organized interests, the
capture dynamic is going to persist. So if you could find a way to fund
agencies without having them so directly tied to Congress, that would
obviously be ideal if the goal is more insulation. When the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) was set up, its funding was set up
as a percentage of the Fed's budget. 8 That, by the way, is one of the
leading features of the agency that is being attacked by the financial
industry. But obviously that funding gives the agency a lot more heft to
do what it wants to do. It does not have to worry about funding issues.
The other thing you could do is you could think about
appointments. You could think about who you want to have work at the
agencies in the first place to try to break up that agency culture of
capture just a little bit. Perhaps you need to have on your top
management team or heading the agency or as a member of the
commission, somebody who has worked in consumer protection or
somebody who has worked for whatever the outside interest is that has
otherwise gotten no or little air time at the agency. This will not be a
cure-all, but at least it would go some step towards breaking this cycle.
You could also think about putting in employment restrictions on where
people go after they leave the agency. You could slow down the
revolving-door-because you are not really going to be able to stop it.
You could think about having there be some limit on how quickly
people can move to the very industries they have regulated.
Another idea to reduce capture is to think about where else in
government there are agencies that care about the interest that you are
trying to get more attention. For instance, if you are thinking about
consumer interests, you would try to think where else we have in
position an agency that might help be kind of a watchdog to pressure the
financial services agencies. You could think about something like the
FTC. The idea is if you have an agency that is already thinking about
consumer interests, to think about how you plug them in so that they
can also be a voice to issues that are not getting enough airtime.
We usually think about all this as a national issue, but there are
a lot of state attorneys general out there who did some pretty amazing
things in the run-up to this crisis and tried to do more before they were

8. See Dodd-Frank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5497 (2012).
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preempted. So when you are setting up these regulatory schemes in the
first place, you can think about how you want to use states as partners
and have the states either help you enforce the federal laws or maybe
create regulations of their own. This idea is vehemently opposed by all
the financial interests, particularly when it is a question of state
substantive laws and that is a thornier issue. But on the enforcement
question, if you think about the state AGs just being extra cops on the
beat to enforce the rules the federal entities set up, then the idea could
be that they could help what might otherwise be an under-resourced
federal agency enforce the national laws.
Another capture reduction technique is to give an agency more
political weight if it is out there trying to protect, for example, the
consumer interest. How do you think about getting more focus on Main
Street for an agency? The media cares about Main Street, but who
gives information to the media? How do they get their stories? You
know agencies have top-level officials who speak on the condition of
anonymity, who tell the media about various things. But, how do they
get other information out there? You can think about giving agencies
the kind of tools they need to generate information the media is going to
care about. Give agencies a data operation and let them speak directly
to the media without having to get approval first from some oversight
agency or body. The idea would be, in the financial world for example,
to let the agency gather data on mortgages or credit card terms or
whatever the issue is, and have a platform to get that information to the
American people.
Another opportunity for capture reduction is to think about
which congressional oversight committee is going to look over the
agency's shoulder. It really matters whether or not you set up an
agency that has to answer to the Banking Committee or whether it is
answering to a Subcommittee on Consumer Protection.
One last thing that you can think about is setting up consumer
advocates within the agency. They would be internal watchdogs that
would exist within the agency who could try to keep tabs on or always
be the voice representing consumer interests at the agency.
None of these things is going to be the magic bullet to solve
agency capture, but these would be the kind of steps you would have to
take if you were trying to figure out how you get the agency to second
guess the instincts it may have developed over time to favor a particular

2013]

EXPLAINING AND CURBING CAPTURE

25

industry. One thing to keep in mind is not to view the agencies as evil,
but to rationally figure out why they might be in the place that they are.
Why might they have got to that point that it is hard to get an airing of
opposing interests? Once you break that down, it lends some insight
into how you go about getting us closer to the ideal of having an agency
that is able to pursue the public interest as much as it pursues the
interest of one particular group.

